Was Confederate Defeat Inevitable
Ryan Toews
About two years ago I bought Steven Newton’s Lost for the Cause: The Confederate Army in
1864, (2000). It definitely was the best read of this last year. Newton not
only provides a complete order of battle for the Confederate army for April
1864, but also examines a number of issues dealing with the last year of the
war.
His first chapter is an extension of the order of
battle he has constructed. He concludes that the Confederacy was able to
mobilize an additional 75,000 men in the course of the winter of 1863-64. In a
comparison of the ratio of Confederate troops to Union strength it is demonstrated
that the ratio did not fall from the mid-1863 levels until the latter half of
1864. Building on this, Newton concludes that to say the South was inevitably
overwhelmed by the greater numbers and/or economic might of the North is
untenable. The South lost not by a lack of troops but by the mismanagement of
the forces it raised.
Comparing troop strength ratios and losses in eastern
Virginia the Army of Northern Virginia never fell below 57% of the Army of the
Potomac.
Date US
Present for Duty Strength CS
PFD Strength
30 June 64 110,262
63,234
(57%)
31 August 60,167 50,029
(83%)
31 October 90,043 51,729
(57%)
30 November 111,919 71,514
(64%)
From this Newton claims, with good reason, that Lee successfully
held Grant to a stalemate in front of Petersburg. The idea that the fighting in
first the Overland Campaign and then the Petersburg Campaign successfully
attritioned down the Army of Northern Virginia cannot be sustained.
In the Valley Early was also initially successful in
tying down a much larger Union force. By the time the last major battle was
fought at Cedar Creek in early October Union forces in the Shenandoah were
35,610 strong whereas Confederates had only 14,000 men. This strength ratio of
40% was considerably lower than the strength ratio Lee enjoyed because of the
heavy detachment of Federal forces to the Shenandoah. Here Newton observes that
why “Lee failed to make use of Grant’s diversion of force … is a question of strategic
and operations decisions rather than one of resources.”
It was in Georgia that the war was lost for the South.
Looking at the ratios of infantry strength one can see a steady decline in
Confederate strength.
Date US
Present for Duty Strength CS
PFD Strength
31 May 64 94,310
54,263
(57%)
31 August 88,086 48,081 (54%)
31 October 75.659 38,263 (51%)
30 November 67,674 34,818
(51%)
Newton looks further into losses in the Atlanta
Campaign and observes that under Johnson the Rebels maintained a favourable
ratio of losses compared to the Union army. Where the Confederates fell short
was their comparative inability to successfully return convalescents from their
hospitals back to the front line. At the point Johnston was relieved from duty
the Confederates had lost 7,700 fewer battlefield casualties than the Federals,
but the Army of Tennessee had lost a much larger ratio of strength once losses
from disease is factored in.
The battles subsequently fought under Hood resulted in
the Rebels losing 2000 more men than the Federals. Had Hood prevailed in his
attacks the cost would have been worth it, but as it was his operations
severely cost the Army of Tennessee. And as Newton points out, it was the heavy
losses sustained by the Army of Tennessee that crippled the Confederate war
effort.
But was the Confederate loss of the war inevitable? On
23 August 1864 Lincoln wrote in a memo ”it seems exceedingly probable that this
Administration will not be re-elected….” At this time Grant was stalled in the
trenches in front of Petersburg. In the Valley, Sheridan was mustering his
forces at Harpers Ferry, but Early still was holding him at bay. In Georgia,
although Hood had been unable to defeat Sherman in battle, the Army of
Tennessee still held Atlanta in a siege that looked to end up as another
Petersburg stalemate. If, as Lincoln saw it, the upcoming November election
would reflect northern opinion on the course of the war, the war was still not
a clear Northern victory.
Events proved Lincoln’s fears to be unfounded, the
fall of Atlanta and the defeat of Early gave Lincoln the support he needed to
continue the war to the end. But how close was the outcome and was it only a
matter of greater resources on the side of the Union?
Early lost both the Third Battle of Winchester and the
Battle of Fisher’s Hill. His defeat at Cedar Creek, however, came only when
Sheridan successfully rallied his defeated army and launched a counter-attack. Had
Early been a bit more fortunate he might have been able to keep victory within
his grasp. Indeed, if “for the want of a nail” Sheridan’s horse had stumbled and
fell on his 12 mile ride to Cedar Creek….
A re-examination of Hood’s first two battles in front
of Atlanta also shows how events could have changed. In the Battle of Peach
Tree Creek had Hood been able to attack one day sooner the Army of the
Cumberland would have been caught astride Peach Tree Creek and far less
prepared to defend itself. In the actual battle, timing again proved to be
critical as the attack was delayed for two hours. It should be noted, however,
much of this delay was due to poor co-ordination between the Confederate
forces, and command and control issues had long been a problem in the Army of
Tennessee.
Similar problems occurred in Hood’s second attack, the
Battle of Atlanta. Piecemeal Confederate attacks, the miss-deployment of
Hardee’s Corps, and the lucky deployment of a Union division covering the rear
of the Army of the Tennessee resulted in a second Confederate defeat.
But all three of these events could not be necessarily
attributed to the superior resources of the north. Instead it was better generalship
and the roll-of-the-dice in battle that gave the Union its victories.
As an aside, it is interesting to take note of several
recent revisionist examinations of the struggle for Atlanta. Stephan Davis was
one of the first to attempt to defend Hood and point out how close to
success his sorties from Atlanta were. In 2013 Stephan Hood’s John Bell Hood: The
Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General was published.
Although written by a descendent of Hood, the book argues that Hood is very
much misrepresented in history. While the book has its faults, more importantly
the author has uncovered Hood’s collection of papers which were previously
thought to be lost. The impending publication of these papers should be of
considerable interest to historians of the western theatre.
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